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between 2005 and the 30th of June 2010. We observed their administrative path.
Among those available in the first teaching hospital group in France (42 hospitals),
we evaluated the potential variables associated with the unit price growth rate
before and after MA. RESULTS: During the study period, 77 ATUs obtained a MA,
mostly after a European approval. Cancer represented the major therapeutic area
with 21 drugs. After MA, 9 previous ATUs (12%) were not considered by the High
commission for health (HAS) to have neither major nor important medical benefit
and 19 (25%) were not supposed to bring some benefits compared to existing ther-
apies. For the price growth rate’s analysis, 57 drugs were retrieved (9 previous free
ATUs were excluded): 68.4% had a decreasing price after MA whereas 17.5% in-
creased and 14% were stable. Overall mean price growth rate was -12.1%  22.6%.
The improvement in medical benefit assessed by HAS was not a predictor of the
growth rate (p0.392). CONCLUSIONS: From these results, pharmaceutical compa-
nies seem marketing these compassionate drugs, for which the benefit/risk ratio is
only presumed, at a price that guarantees a margin for future negotiations.
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OBJECTIVES:An inspection system that controls the prescription of specific groups
of pharmaceutical products exits in Spain. It requires certain prescriptions to be
authorized by a medical inspector. Traditionally, it has been carried out manually.
Currently, the implementation of an electronic system has modified the whole
process of prescription and dispensation of medicines countrywide. This study
aims to explore health care professionals’ views on the impact of the implemen-
tation of an electronic system on the prescription and dispensation of specifically
controlled medicines in the country. METHODS: Observational, exploratory, two
phases study. This abstract reports on phase 1 that included a literature review, a
review of current legislation, and telephone, audio-tape recorded semi-structured
interviews with primary care physicians, endocrinologists, pharmacists, medical
inspectors and regional health authorities from urban and rural areas across coun-
try until data saturation. A content analysis of interview transcriptions was con-
ducted. Data triangulation was performed. RESULTS: A total of 58 interviews were
conducted (21 primary care physicians, 11 endocrinologists, 6 pharmacists, 9 med-
ical inspectors, 11 health authority representatives). Three mechanisms for autho-
rizing the prescription of specifically controlled medicines exist across regions:
manual, electronic, and linked to electronic dispensation. The electronic system
speeds up the process and favors that the prescription of treatments more strictly
adjust to the clinical condition they have been authorized for. From health author-
ities’ and medical inspectors’ perspective, the inspection of prescription contrib-
utes to avoiding medicines misuse. From the physicians’ view, the inspection sys-
tem mostly serves to control the spending on medicines. Alternative strategies
based on professional training and education would more effectively contribute to
preventing treatments mishandling. CONCLUSIONS: Electronic mechanisms for
authorizing the prescription and dispensation of specifically controlled medicines
vary across regions. Differences on the perceived ultimate value of the inspection
system exist amongst physicians, medical inspectors and health authorities.
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OBJECTIVES: Health care spending has risen steadily in most countries, becoming
a concern for decision-makers worldwide. Commentators often point to the diffu-
sion of new medical technology as a key driver for burgeoning expenditures. This
paper critically appraises this conjecture, based on an analysis of existing litera-
ture, with the aim of offering a more detailed and considered analysis of the impact
of technological innovation on spending. METHODS: Key databases (e.g., PubMed,
EMBASE) were searched to identify relevant literature. Several categories of studies
(e.g., multivariate analyses, policy analyses) were included to cover different per-
spectives and issues regarding the relationship between medical technology and
costs. Applicable abstracts were identified and selected articles reviewed. A stan-
dardised template was developed to extract relevant information from the select
literature, which was then analysed for key themes across: impact of technology on
costs, factors influencing this relationship, and noted methodological challenges in
measuring such linkages. RESULTS: A total of 150 studies were reviewed. The
analysis suggests that the relationship between medical technology and spending
is complex and often conflicting. Study conclusions were often contingent on vary-
ing contextual factors, such as the sector examined, availability of other interven-
tions, population trends, and the methodological approach employed. Moreover,
the impact of medical technologies on costs differed across technologies; some
(e.g., cancer drugs, invasive devices) had significant financial implications, while
others were cost-neutral or cost-saving. Several studies examined technology in
general, making it difficult to tease out the contribution of different types of
interventions. CONCLUSIONS: Ascertaining the impact of technological advances
on spending is difficult to quantify (and qualify). Issues of causality and incomplete
knowledge of the interactions between technology and other factors affecting ex-
penditures often constrain the reliability of analyses. We argue that it would be
more productive to ask if investments in medical technology result in better value
in health care.
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OBJECTIVES: This study assesses the evolution of international reference pricing
(IRP) across 34 countries, from 2006 to 2011. Its current influence on innovative drug
pricing in the leading five European Union (EU) markets was also considered.
METHODS: An international reference pricing matrix was created and reviewed to
see if the basket of countries referred by nations to price their pharmaceuticals had
changed. Pharmaceutical prices were also used to review 2011 prices of five ran-
domly selected innovative blockbuster molecules across EU-5 countries; the mol-
ecules in question were bevacizumab, adalimumab, etanercept, rosuvastatin and
infliximab.RESULTS:The EU-5 markets lead the reference basket used by countries
in their price setting process both in 2006 and 2011. Countries that reference these
markets are varied and not limited to economically similar markets both within
and outside the EU. While there have been additions and deletions, many countries
have largely maintained their reference basket of countries. Since 2006, more
emerging markets have become IRP prescribers. Unlike Brazil, and Turkey, which
followed IRP prior to 2006 and exclusively use developed country prices to price
their own products, the newer emerging market followers have also chosen to
include neighbouring countries and/or economically similar country prices in their
mechanism. A comparison of 2011 prices across the EU-5 markets showed less
price variation between countries that followed IRP compared to those that fol-
lowed free pricing, but prices were not necessarily lower. CONCLUSIONS: Coun-
tries using IRP still rely on EU-5 drug prices to price their medicines. However, new
adopters of the mechanism are including similar and neighbouring countries to
arrive at affordable rates and prevent parallel export. With more emerging markets
rolling out IRP, it is notable that in the absence of a set formula that identifies the
lowest prices, this technique is one of cost harmonization rather than cost contain-
ment.
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OBJECTIVES:We surveyed pharmaceutical prices in 18 countries (mix of developed
and emerging countries). The goal of the survey was to analyze and compare drug
prices in an attempt to determine the countries where drug pricing procedures are
more favorable or more stringent, as well as the countries where price cuts are
common and where price increases can still be expected. METHODS: The method-
ology was based on estimated ex-manufacturer pricing data from PharmOnLine
International, looking at current and historical drug prices in 18 countries. For each
country, all prescription drugs by average manufacturer prices were looked at, as
well as by therapeutic area. Several case studies were also analyzed. RESULTS:
With countries having their own legislation and standards when it comes to drug
pricing, significant price differentials are seen between countries. By far, condi-
tions are still most favorable in the US. Legislation is more restrictive in other
markets, notably in the European Union. Our data finds that the ongoing pricing
reform in Germany has already had a significant impact on drug prices, which are
dropping. Conditions are more attractive for innovative drugs in certain emerging
countries - including Brazil or Russia - where pharmaceutical companies are in-
creasingly investing as demonstrated with the large number of innovative drugs
marketed in those countries. Additionally, a significant number of case studies
demonstrate that innovative drugs are highly priced and that price increases can
still be expected in those countries. CONCLUSIONS: With stringent pricing legisla-
tions in developed countries, opportunities are now seen in emerging countries
where pharmaceutical companies increasingly invest. In these markets, the chal-
lenge is seen at the reimbursement and volume levels. Nevertheless, with govern-
ments enhancing their healthcare systems, the data points to the conclusion that
the basket of drugs funded will increase in the near future.
PHP14
MULTIPLE INDICATION PRICING, REIMBURSEMENT AND FUNDING DYNAMICS:
THE CASE OF ORPHAN INDICATIONS
Wild L, Forster L
Double Helix Consulting, London, UK
OBJECTIVES: Indication expansion is a commonly utilized strategy to maximize
return on investment for novel pharmaceuticals. As orphan drug designation can
confer pricing, reimbursement and funding benefits, such indications can provide
attractive targets for launch or follow-on indications. We aim to understand how
expansions into or out of orphan indications affect a product’s total pricing and
reimbursement opportunity. METHODS: Centering our research on orphan indica-
tions, we explored three potential scenarios that could be reached when expanding
a products indication (from highest to lowest frequency of occurrence): 1) Orphan
(current) to Orphan (indication expansion); 2) Non-Orphan (current) to Orphan
(indication expansion); and 30 Orphan (current) to Non-Orphan (indication expan-
sion). We conducted analogue analysis across a variety of key global markets to
understand the implications on pricing and reimbursement for a product moving
between these groupings. RESULTS: The analogue analysis indication expansion
between orphan indications is relatively common, particularly in oncology. Expan-
sion in this way did not significantly impact product funding or access restrictions,
although pricing can be affected by the increased patient population size. Further-
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